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ABSTRACT 
Blockchain technology is a complicated and emerging technology affecting the way business is 
performed. Blockchain is a decentralised transaction and data management technology which 
was first introduced through the Bitcoin cryptocurrency. Ever since the introduction of Bitcoin in 
2008, interest in the blockchain technology has grown significantly. This is mainly due to the fact 
that this technology has the ability to eliminate the role of trusted third parties with regards to 
security, anonymity and data integrity aspects. 
The purpose of this study was to provide a matrix which can be used as a quick reference to 
indicate the various blockchain characteristics and how they address identified risks with the 
exchange of digital assets and subsequently assist in achieving the control objectives of a 
business. Furthermore, additional risks were identified which potential users need to take into 
consideration before implementing the blockchain technology. 
The matrix was developed by first identifying the significant inherent risks of digital asset 
exchange, namely trust, repudiation, double-spending and theft, including fraud. An 
understanding of how the blockchain technology works was obtained through performing a 
detailed literature review, from which the key characteristics of the blockchain technology was 
identified. This was utilised to provide a matrix for potential users on how a specific blockchain 
characteristic has the ability to address the identified significant risks of digital asset exchange 
and to achieve the control objectives of a business. Additional risks were derived from the 
matrix and further literature work carried out to identify the additional risks which needs to be 
considered before the implementation of the blockchain technology. 
By utilising the matrix provided, various industries will be able to evaluate whether the 
blockchain technology will assist them in addressing their specific risks and achieving their 
control objectives. 
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UITTREKSEL 
Blockchain-tegnologie is 'n gekompliseerde en opkomende tegnologie wat die manier hoe 
besigheid uitgevoer word affekteer. Blockchain is 'n gedesentraliseerde transaksie- en 
databasis-bestuurstegnologie wat die eerste keer deur die Bitcoin-kripto-geldeenheid 
bekendgestel is. Sedert die bekendstelling van Bitcoin in 2008 het belangstelling in die 
blockchain-tegnologie aansienlik gegroei, hoofsaaklik vanweë die feit dat die tegnologie die 
vermoë het om die rol van vertroude derde partye uit te skakel met betrekking tot sekuriteit, 
anonimiteit en data-integriteit. 
Die doel van hierdie studie was om 'n matriks te verskaf wat as 'n vinnige verwysing gebruik kan 
word om die verskillende blockchain-eienskappe aan te dui en te toon hoe dit die 
geïdentifiseerde risiko's met die oordrag van digitale bates aanspreek en gevolglik 
beheerdoelwitte van die besigheid bereik. Verder is die oorblywende risiko's geïdentifiseer wat 
potensiële gebruikers in ag moet neem voordat die blockchain-tegnologie geïmplementeer 
word. 
Die matriks is ontwikkel deur eerstens die beduidende inherente risiko's van digitale bate-
uitruiling te identifiseer, naamlik vertroue, repudiasie, dubbelbesteding en diefstal, insluitend 
bedrog. 'n Begrip van hoe die blockchain-tegnologie werk is verkry deur 'n uitgebreide 
literatuuroorsig te doen, waaruit die sleutelkenmerke van die blockchain-tegnologie 
geïdentifiseer is. Dit is aangewend om 'n matriks vir potensiële gebruikers te verskaf, wat 
verduidelik hoe 'n spesifieke blockchain-kenmerk die geïdentifiseerde beduidende risiko's van 
digitale bate-oordrag kan aanspreek en kan help om die besigheid se beheerdoelwitte te bereik. 
Oorblywende risiko's is afgelei van die matriks en deur die uitvoer van ŉ verdere literatuuroorsig 
is die oorblywende risiko’s geidentifiseer wat oorweeg moet word voor die implementering van 
die blockchain tegnologie.  
Deur van die matriks gebruik te maak, sal dit verskeie industrieë in staat stel om te evalueer of 
die blockchain-tegnologie hul spesifieke risiko's sal aanspreek en hul beheerdoelwitte sal 
bereik. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
1.1 Introduction and background 
When any transaction occurs between two transacting parties, risks are created when rights 
and obligations are transferred with the exchange of assets. The identified risks need to be 
mitigated through the implementation of internal controls. These risks involved in the 
exchange of physical assets are also present in the exchange of digital assets. The risks 
might even be higher in a digital environment. As such, the identified risks in a digital 
environment will be addressed not only through internal controls but also through the use of 
new technology innovations.  
When assets are exchanged, a system is required to record the transactions. Money and 
payment systems are inherently interconnected. For an asset to perform the function of a 
medium of exchange it is important that the assets are transferred in a secure way, therefore 
a payment system is required. Furthermore, for any system other than the exchange of 
physical banknotes, the values need to be recorded; therefore a ledger is also required. 
Modern payment systems are computerised, resulting in money existing only as digital 
records on commercial banks’ accounts. It is therefore necessary that digital records or 
digital assets be exchanged through a payment system and recorded in a ledger (Ali, 
Barrdear, Clews & Southgate, 2014). 
There have been various attempts at introducing a monetary system that is based on public-
key cryptography. For example, Chaum and Roijakkers (1990) introduced a payment system 
through which payments are performed anonymously and securely, but a trusted third party 
is still required. Chaum and Roijakkers (1990) were also the founders of DigiCashBV, which 
is the first company that provided a cryptographic digital currency. Another attempt at 
introducing a monetary system was Griggs’s Triple Entry Accounting, a payment system 
which was primarily designed for the internal transfer of money (Chaum & Roijakkers, 1990). 
The abovementioned electronic systems are however all centralised, thus they are reliant on 
a trusted third party, who facilitates and controls the transaction.  
Most payment platforms are reliant on private secure communication networks. Visa, for 
example utilises VisaNet, which connects to the Internet for processing, but the network is 
centralised because the nodes, both physical and virtual are owned by Visa (Khan, 2012). 
Currently all internet commerce is linked to a financial institution which performs the role of a 
trusted third party that processes and mediates all electronic transactions (Crosby, 
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Nachiappan, Pattanayak, Verma & Kalyanaraman, 2016). The blockchain technology was 
developed to eliminate the need for a trusted third party. This was achieved by designing a 
system that ensures that the network participants agree on the order of the transactions 
processed without the mediation of a trusted third party (Crosby et al., 2016). 
Bitcoin, created by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008, was the first decentralised electronic currency 
system (Skudnov, 2012). The key innovation of the digital currency Bitcoin is the underlying 
technology, blockchain. Blockchain technology utilises distributed ledgers. These distributed 
ledgers allow payment systems to operate in an entirely decentralised way, without the 
assistance of intermediaries such as banks. With the increased use of digital assets, the 
most significant risks need to be identified and addressed through technology developments. 
For example, digital currencies such as Bitcoin, that combine a new payment system and a 
new currency, hold various risks with the exchange of the digital assets. These risks need to 
be identified and addressed through internal controls and new technology innovations such 
as blockchain technology. 
1.2 Historical review 
Research on Bitcoin, the underlying technology blockchain, digital assets, cryptocurrencies 
and risks has been documented in various forms. The research conducted to date can be 
categorised in three types: (1) research performed with regard to the Bitcoin application and 
the analysing of the underlying technology on a technical level, (2) research performed 
based on the challenges and limitations of the blockchain technology and (3) research 
presenting applications based on the blockchain technology. 
Most of the research has been performed on the Bitcoin application as this is the first and 
most well-known application of the blockchain technology and the application which first 
introduced the blockchain technology. The research conducted on the Bitcoin application is 
based on Nakamoto’s study published in 2008. Other studies have been very technical, 
analysing the underlying blockchain technology on a technical level, for example Skudnov 
(2012), who conducted a technical study on the different Bitcoin clients.  The different users 
of the Bitcoin application was categorised by Skudnov (2012) into different Bitcoin clients 
depending on the role they perform in a Bitcoin transaction. The technical concepts of the 
Bitcoin application were also discussed. 
Extensive research has been conducted based on the technical challenges and limitations of 
the blockchain technology as identified by Swan (2015). Most research is performed on the 
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security and privacy of the blockchain (Yli-Huumo, Ko, Choi, Park & Smolander, 2016). For 
example: research has been conducted by Vasek, Thornton and Moore (2014) on security 
aspects of the blockchain technology and four types of Bitcoin security incidents were 
investigated, while Lim, Kim, Lee, Lee, Nam-Gung and Lee (2014) analysed the trend of 
security breaches in the Bitcoin application, and its possible countermeasures. 
Other research has focused on possible applications of the blockchain technology in various 
industries such as insurance, the financial sector, and smart contracts. Examples of studies 
include the following: Guo and Liang (2016) conducted a study on the possibilities of the 
blockchain technology in the banking industry; Bahga and Madisetti (2016) presented a 
decentralised peer-to-peer platform for Industrial Internet of Things which is based on the 
blockchain technology; and Abeyratne and Monfared (2016) discussed the potential benefits 
of the blockchain technology in the manufacturing supply chain.  
Whilst valuable research has been conducted in these areas, the practical application has 
been limited since the discussions remain mainly theoretical or technically based in nature, 
or look at the possible application in a specific industry in isolation, or deal with specific 
aspects of the technology only. Thus, the research conducted in this study is aimed to be 
more practical where the blockchain characteristics were identified and discussed through 
the various levels of a general transaction and these characteristics were mapped to the 
risks identified with the exchange of digital assets – and furthermore linked to the control 
objectives of a business transaction.   
The study was aimed at practical guidance. It provides evidence to the user on how the 
implementation of this technology could possibly address business risks and assist in 
achieving control objectives on a transaction level. 
1.3 Research questions and research objective 
This study sought to identify the significant risks of the exchange of digital assets and to 
investigate the manner in which the blockchain technology might address these risks. 
It is important to note that this study addressed the following possible risks identified for the 
exchange of digital assets: trust, double-spending, theft (including fraudulent transactions) 
and repudiation. Although other related risks may be present in the environment that forms 
part of the topic of this article (exchange of digital assets), the abovementioned risks, and 
how blockchain technology addresses the risks is discussed in this thesis. 
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This study investigated the blockchain technology in general terms. It was not the purpose of 
this study to provide an in-depth technical analysis of blockchain technology nor did it aim to 
provide a complete list of possible applications. The research questions were therefore as 
follows:  
 What are the most significant, inherent risks when digital assets are exchange?
 What are the underlying characteristics of the blockchain technology which could
potentially address the most significant, inherent risks, identified?
 How is the blockchain technology utilised in a specific application, Bitcoin, to address
these risks for a standard Bitcoin exchange transaction?
 What are the additional risks the users should be aware of before implementing the
blockchain technology?
Lastly, this study did not intend to address any technical problems relating to the functioning 
of the blockchain technology, but merely provides a framework of how the characteristics of 
the blockchain technology could address these risks. 
1.4  Scope limitations 
The research reported in this thesis focused only on significant, inherent risks relating to the 
exchange of digital assets and did not intend to create an exhaustive list of all risks that may 
arise from the exchange of digital assets. Therefore, only the most differentiating 
characteristics of the underlying Blockchain technology addressing these risks were 
formulated.  
Digital assets have a complex definition and were defined in the study, but the research 
was limited to digital commodities defined as assets, for example, Bitcoin. 
1.5 Research motivation 
As explained in section 1.2, most researchers have thus far focused on the various 
applications and possibilities of the blockchain technology in various industries, whilst others 
identified the risks within the blockchain technology which users and developers should 
consider for future application and development. However, considering that blockchain is a 
new technology, more specific research is required to allow management to understand how 
the blockchain technology could assist them in addressing the risks of digital asset 
exchange.  
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This research will assist management, IT professionals, auditors and other relevant role-
players in understanding how the blockchain technology works and how it could potentially 
address the risks associated with the exchange of digital assets. The matrix developed 
contains the identified significant risks and how they are addressed by the specific 
blockchain technology characteristics. The additional risks that should be considered by 
users are also identified and will add value to potential users of the blockchain technology. 
Considering the increased use and necessity for the exchange of digital assets, this 
research will be both beneficial and crucial to future business trading and how to manage 
such types of exchange of digital assets. 
1.6  Organisational structure of research 
This research is presented in six chapters. Chapter two describes the design and 
methodology of the research. Chapter three contains a discussion of the risk identification 
process used to identify the most significant, inherent risks with the exchange of digital 
assets. Internal control and risk management are briefly discussed as measures to address 
such identified risks.  
Chapter four contains the literature review and includes the definition and explanation of 
theoretical and technical concepts. Chapter four also includes a discussion of the underlying 
characteristics of the blockchain technology, which is categorised in the various levels of a 
typical digital asset exchange transaction. The Bitcoin application is utilised  to explain the 
blockchain characteristics in more detail. These identified characteristics, in the various 
levels of a digital asset transaction form the basis for the findings presented in Chapter five. 
Chapter five contains a risk-based characteristics matrix, linking the inherent risks identified 
in Chapter three to the blockchain characteristics identified in Chapter four. The matrix could 
be used as a quick reference guide as it indicates which specific blockchain characteristics 
address the identified risks. Chapter five also includes a discussion of the additional risks 
which potential users need to consider before implementing the blockchain technology as a 
control mechanism to address the risks of the exchange of digital assets. Chapter six 
provides an overview of the study by summarising the key findings. It concludes with the 
identification of potential areas of future research in the field of blockchain technology.  
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CHAPTER 2.  RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Purpose of the study 
The aim of this study was to identify the most significant, inherent risks for the exchange of 
digital assets and to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the blockchain technology 
and underlying characteristics which could potentially address these risks. A non-empirical, 
qualitative study was conducted together with an extensive literature review. 
2.2 Literature study 
The literature review included papers published in accredited research journals, articles in 
information technology publications and websites on a local and international front. The 
following areas were researched: 
 Digital asset exchange and the inherent risks related to the transfer of ownership of
assets;
 Gaining an understanding of the blockchain technology;
 Gaining an understanding of the Bitcoin application;
 Advantages of blockchain; and
 Risks of blockchain applications.
The methodology that was employed to address the research objectives is explained below. 
2.3 Research methodology 
With the aim of identifying the blockchain characteristics which could potentially address the 
most significant inherent risks with the exchange of digital assets, the following steps were 
followed: 
Step 1: The most significant inherent risks with regards to the exchange of digital assets 
were identified and derived from the basic business assumptions of a transaction 
(control objectives).  
Step 1.1: The basic business assumptions of a transaction were found to be in-
line with the control objectives of a transaction, as defined by ISA 315, namely: 
completeness, accuracy, validity, integrity and privacy (International Standard on 
Auditing 315 (Revised), 2014). 
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Step 1.2: Through extensive literature research performed on the risks of the 
transfer of digital assets the most significant risks were identified. Although the 
risk in a traditional environment is different from the risks in a digital environment, 
the control objectives are the same. 
Step 1.3: In the majority of research performed the following were the main risks 
identified that needs to be addressed with the transfer of digital assets. Trust (to 
achieve validity), double-spending (to achieve validity and integrity), theft (to 
achieve validity, integrity and privacy) and repudiation (to achieve validity). These 
risks are regarded as the most significant risks with the exchange of digital assets 
because if these risks are not addressed the control objectives will not be 
achieved. These key risks identified formed the basis of the research conducted. 
How the blockchain technology potentially address these risks, formed the 
subject of this study. 
Step 2: The characteristics of the blockchain technology were identified through gaining a 
comprehensive understanding of the technology.  
Step 2.1: These characteristics were best summarised through discussing the 
identified characteristics at the various levels of a general exchange of digital 
assets transaction and through using the Bitcoin application as an example.  
Step 3: Mapping of blockchain technology characteristics to identified risks.  
Step 3.1: Obtaining an understanding of how traditional controls are currently 
attempting to address identified risks with the exchange of digital assets. 
Step 3.2:  A mapping between the identified blockchain characteristics and the 
most significant, inherent risks of the exchange of digital assets and the control 
objectives of a transaction was performed. 
Step 4: The additional risks, identified through mapping performed in step 3 and other 
risks identified during research performed in step 1.2, were grouped together to 
provide a list of additional risks users need to consider before implementing the 
blockchain technology. 
2.4 Conclusion 
The literature review provided a good theoretical foundation for an understanding of the risks 
in the exchange of digital assets; the Bitcoin application; and the underlying blockchain 
technology. 
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The methodology ensured that the most significant, inherent risks for the exchange of digital 
assets were identified and the characteristics of the blockchain technology were sufficiently 
explained through using the Bitcoin application as an example.  
The research ultimately provides a quick reference matrix linking the most significant, 
inherent risks of the exchange of digital assets to the blockchain characteristics, addressing 
this risk, and the control objectives of a business transaction achieved.  
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CHAPTER 3.  THE INHERENT RISKS OF DIGITAL ASSET EXCHANGE 
3.1 Introduction 
When any digital asset exchange transaction occurs between two or more transaction 
parties, there are various risks involved. These risks need to be identified through a risk  
assessment process and managed through the implementation of control procedures which 
could reduce the risks to an acceptable level. The inherent and most significant risks as well 
as other important aspects, when digital assets are exchanged, are discussed below.  
When digital assets are exchanged between two transacting parties, various risks are 
created relating to rights and obligations of the underlying asset. Before these risks are 
discussed, the terms used in this chapter are first defined. 
i) Risk
A risk is defined as any procedure, activity or occurrence which could have a negative effect 
on the entity in achieving its objectives (CICA, 1998). The King IV Report on Corporate 
Governance (IODSA, 2016) added to this definition by including that, the uncertain event can 
have both a positive and a negative effect on the entity’s ability to achieve its objectives. 
Risk is furthermore seen as a function of the probability of a specific threat exploiting a 
potential vulnerability of the entity and the resulting effect of that undesirable event on the 
entity (Stoneburner, Goguen & Feringa, 2002).  
Each entity needs to identity the specific risks it is exposed to through a risk assessment 
process. These risks will be dependent on a number of factors, including the industry in 
which the entity operates, the transacting parties and security risks, to name but a few. New, 
additional risks are introduced as a company changes its business processes, for example 
by moving from the physical exchange of assets to the digital exchange of assets (Butler, 
2004). 
Since risks differ in the various industries, the different types of business transactions, 
processes and systems utilised, this study was limited to one specific type of transaction, 
namely the exchange of digital assets between two transacting parties. Before the risks of 
the exchange of digital assets are discussed, it is necessary to define what physical and 
digital assets are. 
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ii) Physical and digital assets
Assets are broadly defined by the Conceptual Framework for financial reporting (2010) as a 
resource that is controlled by the entity, and which can be exchanged for other assets or 
utilised by the entity to generate income, ultimately resulting in the increase in economic 
benefits. Digital assets include stocks, bonds, gift cards and other forms of credit. However, 
digital assets have a more complex definition as noted by Windsor (2016), who concluded 
that there are generally three definitions of digital assets, summarised below: 
 Media files such as photos and videos, which can be linked to metadata;
 A digital representation of an individual or entity and related metadata; and
 Digital commodities, represented as assets, for which the value is expressed by
using metadata.
Metadata is data or information which provides information and details about the underlying 
data. It is of high importance and a necessary feature when digital assets are defined 
(Windsor, 2016). 
The scope of this research was limited to the last element of the digital asset definition as 
described above, namely digital commodities as assets. One such commodity, namely 
Bitcoin, was the focus of this study. Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency, which is an example of a 
blockchain application, as discussed in Chapter four.  
During a general exchange of digital asset transaction, the digital asset is transferred from 
the selling party to the buying party. For example: Party A will transfer three Bitcoins to party 
B. Risks will be present during the transfer of the digital asset, namely Bitcoins. Internal 
control measures and risk management as discussed below in section 3.2 and 3.3 are 
implemented to address the identified risks, as discussed in section 3.6.  
3.2 Internal control 
The risks present during the exchange of digital assets need to be sufficiently addressed 
through the implementation of internal control systems.  
Internal control is defined by the COSO report (Internal Control – Integrated Framework, 
Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission, 1992) as the process 
which is implemented with the purpose of providing reasonable assurance that the entity will 
be able to achieve its objectives. The internal control process is implemented by an entity’s 
board of directors, senior management and other staff members (Integrated Framework, 
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Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission, 1992). Therefore, the 
risks identified during the exchange of digital assets need to be addressed through internal 
controls to ensure that the entity’s objectives are achieved. 
There are various forms of internal control measures which can be implemented to address 
identified risks. It is important to note that the most efficient internal control methods should 
be implemented to address a specific identified risk. The various forms of internal control 
methods to address identified risks are beyond the scope of this study. This study focused 
specifically on how the technology advances through the Blockchain application could 
possibly address such identified risks as a form of internal control. 
3.3  Risk management 
The processes by which risks are identified and addressed through internal controls are 
known as risk management. Risk management is defined by the King IV report (IODSA, 
2016) under principle 4.1 as the process by which the governing body should manage risks 
and opportunities in such a manner that supports the entity in defining its main function, 
determining and achieving its strategic objectives.  
Risk management has also been defined as the process by which management control the 
operational and economic costs of internal control procedures to ensure that the information 
technology systems and data are protected and support the entity’s objectives (Stoneburner 
et al., 2002). 
Although the risk management process is the basis of the implementation of internal control 
measures to address identified risks, it was beyond the scope of the study. However, the 
characteristics of the blockchain technology could potentially be used as an internal control 
measure to address identified risks and to be utilised in the risk management process. 
3.4  Criteria of business transactions 
Romney and Steinbart (2003) concluded that any business transaction has three control 
objectives, namely validity, integrity and privacy. These terms can be explained as follows: 
 Validity: A transacting party should be able to confirm the identity of the other
transacting parties to ensure that the transaction is valid and enforceable.
 Integrity: Transacting parties need to ensure that the information contained in the
transaction is accurate and has not been changed during the transmission process.
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 Privacy: The privacy and confidentiality of business transactions and other
information contained in the transaction message during the exchange needs to be
maintained.
Traditionally, completeness and accuracy are also regarded as important control objectives 
in a manual business process. However, in a digital environment internal control measures 
have changed, to rather include the utilisation of other technology to address these identified 
risks and control objectives. 
3.5     Risks within an electronic (digital) environment 
The traditional risks within a manual system that prevent the achievement of business 
objectives are still applicable in a digital environment. The criteria of any business 
transaction, as discussed in section 3.4, are the same for the exchange of physical and 
digital assets. The internal control methods to achieve an entity’s business objectives are, 
however, different in an electronic environment.   
As stated previously, ‘new’ risks arise with a change in business models, thus when moving 
from the exchange of physical assets to the exchange of digital assets these ‘new’ risks 
need to be addressed in a different manner. When the environment in which the entity 
operates and the technology utilised for the business processes changes, the internal 
controls also need to be adjusted to ensure that the risks are adequately addressed.  
In e-commerce transactions, for example, the exchange of digital assets is recorded through 
public networks, such as the Internet or peer-to-peer networks. Already, in 1999, Weber 
identified three problems with e-commerce transactions which are still a risk today, namely 
that transacting parties need to:  
a. be able to determine each other’s identity;
b. be able to protect the privacy of their transacting details; and
c. ensure that a secure exchange of money for goods and services can occur
These three problems are also related to the three fundamental criteria of any business 
transaction, namely validity (refer to a.), integrity (refer to b.) and privacy (refer to c.), as 
noted above (Romney & Steinbart, 2003). These fundamental criteria were utilised as the 
basis for the identification of the inherent risks, with the exchange of digital assets (see 
section 3.6 below). 
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3.6     Inherent risks with the exchange of digital assets 
In any business transaction there are various risks involved and these risks differ among 
various business processes. Through the risk assessment process all the risks within a 
specific business process will be identified and addressed through risk management 
processes and the implementation of internal controls as required by King IV (IODSA, 2016). 
In this study, the inherent risks with the exchange of digital assets were identified by using 
the fundamental criteria of any business transaction, namely validity, integrity and privacy as 
a basis (Romney & Steinbart, 2003). The process is discussed below. 
Firstly, to achieve validity in a business transaction, non-repudiation needs to be ensured 
between transacting parties. Non-repudiation also forms part of the five categories of the 
Information Security Goals as defined by the International Organisation for Standardisation 
(ISO, 2013) and Tak, Lee and Park (2003). Therefore, the risk of repudiation is considered to 
be an inherent risk when digital assets are exchanged. 
Secondly, in traditional payment systems, when assets have been exchanged for a 
monetary value, a trusted third party is required to ensure that the transaction is valid. 
Therefore, trust is an important element to ensure the validity of a transaction. 
Ratnasingham (1998) also concluded that trust or the lack thereof is one of the most 
significant risks between transacting parties when digital assets are exchanged. 
Thirdly, to ensure the validity and integrity of a transaction, it is important that double-
spending does not occur between transacting parties. Double-spending is regarded as a 
significant risk when digital assets are exchanged (Fan, Huang & Yu, 2013). 
Lastly, in ensuring validity, integrity and privacy of a transaction, theft (including fraud) is 
always considered a risk when assets are exchanged. This aspect needs to be addressed at 
all times (Loster, 2005). 
Although there are various risks involved in any business transaction, the four risks identified 
above, namely repudiation, lack of trust, double-spending and theft, including fraud, is 
considered the most significant, inherent risks, when digital assets are exchanged. These 
risks were addressed in this study. The identified risks are discussed in more detail below. 
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3.6.1 Repudiation 
One of the most significant risks when digital assets are exchanged between transacting 
parties is the risk of repudiation of the transaction by the initiator (sender/transferor) of the 
digital asset. Repudiation can be explained as the denial, refusal or renouncement of the 
sending transacting party of his/her commitment to exchange the digital asset or assets to 
the receiving party. Repudiation may result from unauthorised transactions or discrepancies 
and will be discussed below (Butler, 2004): 
 Unauthorised transactions created, which are unknown to the initiating transacting
party, while his/her details were used; and/or
 Discrepancies between the original transaction messages. This might result from
unintentional mistakes, or intentional unauthorised changes which are made to the
initial transaction after the initial transaction was accepted by the two transacting
parties.
In summary, it can therefore be said that to ensure that transactions are not repudiated, the 
following important aspects need to be confirmed: 
 The validity of the transaction, including the source it came from;
 The integrity of the transaction, to ensure that unauthorised changes were not
subsequently made to authorised transactions.
To ensure the validity of a transaction, its authenticity also needs to be confirmed. 
Authenticity is the reliance upon establishing and preserving the identity and the integrity of a 
record from the time it was created and subsequently until it is deleted (Rogers, 2015). 
Digital records are generally maintained for a period of time in the system from which they 
were generated. The period of maintaining the record differs depending on the purpose of 
the record. For example, entities might have sufficient record management programs that 
include retention schedules or alternatively it might only be linked to the decommissioning of 
the system that generated the record. It is important that the system that originates the 
records also determines an identity for the records (Rogers, 2015). Determining an identity 
for the records is the process whereby the records are registered in a schedule and 
assigned an unique identifier (Rogers, 2015). These procedures, which are also specified in 
standard information technology security controls (ISO, 2013), entail that maintaining the 
recording system will help to ensure the integrity of the data within the system.  
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To conclude: non-repudiation within a digital environment requires that neither the sender 
nor the receiver of the message is able to disagree on the sending or receiving of the 
message. Thus, the receiver can prove that the message was sent by the assumed sender 
and the message was received by the assumed receiver (Stallings, 1995). 
3.6.2 Lack of trust 
Trust is generally defined as confidence in the character, ability, strength, or trust of 
someone or something. Trust is furthermore a condition of a relationship to which something 
is committed or entrusted to be cared for, in the interest of another party. Trust has also 
been defined by Ghosh (2001) as the confidence in the transacting party that the transacting 
party is reliable, has integrity and has qualities such as consistency, competence, honesty, 
fairness and responsibility. What it means with respect to trusting records and the conditions 
required to achieve trust, is still an open research question.  
The discussion about trusted records or systems is linked to two concepts: reliability and 
authenticity (Mak, 2012). Reliability, with regard to records, is defined as the trustworthiness 
of a record based on the capabilities of the transacting party creating the record, the 
completeness of the record and the controls present when the record was initially created 
(Duranti & Rogers, 2012). Reliability of records is mandated by standards for record 
management. For example, ISO (2013) defines a reliable record as a record of which the 
contents can be trusted as an accurate and complete representation of the transaction or 
activities.  
Determining trust is based on a risk assessment process where the following four items are 
evaluated (Duranti & Rogers, 2012): 
 Reputation, which includes the evaluation of the transacting parties’ past actions and
conduct;
 Performance, which is the relationship between the current activities and activities
required to complete the transaction;
 Competence, which is the knowledge, skills and talents required to perform the
activities required; and
 Confidence, which is an expectation of the standard of the activities to be expected
by the transacting party.
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Trust and trust development are aspects discussed by Reyesa, Zhangb, Royc, Andersend, 
Whitmoree and Andersend (2013), who note that trust is generally seen as a two-party 
relationship in which one party accepts the inherent risk of a relationship with another party. 
Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer (1998) mention three mechanisms associated with trust 
development, namely institutional trust, calculative trust and relational trust. Institutional trust 
refers to the existence of an institutional framework that regulates the relationship between 
the main parties, for example in terms of contracts, guarantees, laws and regulations. 
Calculative trust refers to the estimation of the risks and the benefits of the interaction with 
another party. Lastly, relational trust is the recognition of the trustworthiness of other parties 
in a repeated relationship. Compared to calculative trust, relational trust is influenced more 
by environmental changes. These three trust mechanisms are interrelated. For example, 
institutional mechanisms of trust reduce the risk associated with a particular transaction or 
relationship. Calculative trust is important in the beginning of a relationship, while relational 
trust is more important after repeated positive interactions between transacting parties 
(Rousseau et al., 1998). 
Trust is furthermore increased through traceability. When transacting parties know the 
elements of a transaction may be traced, trust is increased because potential problems, 
discrepancies and other disputes could possibly be resolved through working backwards in 
the transacting process and identifying where the problem occurred or who is responsible 
(Steinauer, Wakid & Rasberry, 1997). 
Currently, transactions on the Internet are reliant on financial institutions to process 
electronic payments. These intermediaries fulfil the role of a trusted third party. Even though 
the system works well for most transactions, it still has the inherent risks of a trust-based 
model (Nakamoto, 2008). For example, non-reversible transactions are not really possible in 
a trust-based model because financial institutions cannot deny mediating disputes. When 
transactions are disputed by transacting parties, financial institutions will mediate the dispute 
process, which might result in reversal of the transaction. The cost of the mediation process 
increases transaction costs. With increased transaction costs, small transactions are not 
feasible as the costs of processing these transactions might be higher than the transacting 
amount (Nakamoto, 2008). Furthermore, with the possibility of the reversal of transactions, 
the need for trust increases. 
It is therefore concluded that there is a need for a trusted third party or other mechanisms to 
fulfil the role of a trusted third party to address this risk.  
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3.6.3 Theft, including fraud 
With internet transactions, a certain percentage of fraud is accepted as unavoidable. 
Currently the fraud risk is mainly controlled through trusted third parties, but with any human 
involvement there will always be an element of fraud risk (Nakamoto, 2008). 
For digital currencies, such as Bitcoin, fraud is firstly a concern in the form of double-
spending, as discussed in section 3.6.4 below. Furthermore, resulting from the nature of 
digital assets, theft is also regarded a significant risk. For example, these digital assets, such 
as Bitcoins, are stored on the internet, in digital wallets. When coins are transferred, a 
password, known as a private key, is required. These private keys are stored by the 
transacting parties on their personal computers, thus resulting in these digital assets being 
exposed to an increased risk of theft through the possible hacking of users’ personal 
computer systems (Hanley, 2013). 
This poses an increased risk for cryptocurrencies, resulting mainly from the fact that 
transactions are restricted to the Internet and consequently vulnerable to hacking (Mittal, 
2017). Therefore, fraud, including theft, will always be a concern for cyber security which 
needs to be addressed through the implementation of internal controls. 
3.6.4 Double-spending 
Digital currencies, such as Bitcoin, are susceptible to double-spending. The fact that digital 
units have immaterial replication costs, results in the same units having the potential to be 
fraudulently claimed or spent multiple times (Koch & Pieters, 2017). In the literature on digital 
currency, this is known as the double-spending problem. The double-spending problem 
occurs when a digital representation of currency is used to create multiple copies resulting in 
the same digital currency being spent two or more times (Wayner, 1997). 
Double-spending is closely related to fraud, as the transacting party attempts to transfer 
his/her digital assets more than once (Koch & Pieters, 2017). Currently, the problem of 
double-spending is addressed through a trusted third party who authorises a transaction, but 
the risk of double-spending could also be addressed through the implementation of 
blockchain technology. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter the risks relating to the exchange of digital assets were discussed. Although 
there are various risks when digital assets are exchanged, only the most significant, inherent 
risks were identified, based on the characteristics of a general business transaction. 
The identified risks, namely repudiation, lack of trust, theft, including fraud and double-
spending, formed the basis of this study. Even though there are more risks when digital 
assets are exchanged, depending on the business environment, industry and so forth, only 
the most significant risks were identified and addressed in this study. These identified risks 
were not intended to create an exhaustive list of risks, but were limited to generic inherent 
risks. 
These significant risks identified in the exchange of digital assets need to be addressed 
through the implementation of internal controls and by technology innovations, such as 
blockchain. 
In Chapter 4, the technology innovation, Blockchain, is discussed and the characteristics of 
this technology are explained, since this technology can be used as a form of internal control 
to address the abovementioned risks. 
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CHAPTER 4.  LITERATURE REVIEW: DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS OF THE 
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY INCLUDING THE BITCOIN APPLICATION 
4.1 Introduction 
Any electronic system that records data needs to have a specific format and location in 
which the data in the system is stored. Furthermore, records maintained in an electronic 
register list every transaction which has been recorded by the system. The blockchain is a 
digital register filled with transactions which is constantly growing (Condos, Sorrell & 
Donegan, 2016). 
Blockchain is a distributed ledger, which can be seen as a database of transactions, 
recorded in a distributed manner, by a decentralised network of computers (Wright & De 
Filippi, 2015). As indicated by the name blockchain, it can be split two-fold, namely block and 
chain. The blocks are formed by grouping together transactions into smaller encrypted data 
sets. Each block includes a reference to the previous block and an answer to a complicated 
mathematical puzzle, which results in the validation of the transactions (Pazaitis, De Filippi & 
Kostakis, 2017). The chain is formed by organising the blocks into a linear sequence which 
represents a chain. The blockchain technology was developed from a combination of 
existing technologies, namely peer-to-peer networks, cryptographic algorithms, distributed 
data storage and decentralised consensus mechanisms (Wright & De Fillippi, 2015). 
The blockchain technology is seen by Tapscott and Tapscott (2016) as a general-purpose 
technology which can be utilised by multiple systems that contain valuable information, 
including money, title deeds, intellectual property rights or even votes or identity register 
data. The system is also able to accumulate and save static documents, records and 
transactions (Lorenz, Munstermann, Higginson, Olesen, Bohlken & Ricciardi, 2016). 
Information recorded in the blockchain can never be deleted or altered, therefore the 
blockchain contains a verifiable record of every single transaction recorded within a specific 
blockchain (Crosby et al., 2016). 
The Bitcoin application, which was developed by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008, was the first 
application to introduce the underlying technology, blockchain. The Bitcoin application will be 
used as an example to explain and further expand the understanding of blockchain’s 
characteristics, when discussed in chapter 4.  
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Bitcoin is a permissionless payment system. Thus any participant in the network can read on 
or write to the chain. The Bitcoin blockchain is maintained by a peer-to-peer network. A peer-
to-peer (P2P) network is a network consisting of nodes that are directly connected with each 
other. Since the nodes within the network have equivalent status (Poelstra, 2014), any node 
is able to participate in any stage of the transaction process, for example by generating or 
validating transactions. 
Bitcoin technology introduced two new solutions, namely the blockchain and the consensus 
protocol proof-of-work. Proof-of-work is the process of validating transactions before they are 
recorded in the blockchain. This process is known as mining (Pazaitis et al., 2017).  
The cryptocurrency Bitcoin is used for transacting in the Bitcoin application, and the proof-of-
work consensus system is used for validating transactions. Anonymity is one of the key 
characteristics of the Bitcoin application, and transaction fees are discretionary (Janusz, 
Sikorski & Markus, 2016). 
Furthermore, Bitcoin is known as a peer-to-peer digital payment system which is set up for 
transactions between multiple parties without the inclusion of a trusted third party (Levin, 
2017). Digital signatures and cryptography are technologies which are included in the Bitcoin 
application which enables this.  
Blockchain will be explained through discussing and defining the different elements of a 
blockchain. Firstly, the various types of blockchain systems will be discussed in section 4.2. 
Secondly, relevant blockchain terminology will be defined in section 4.3. Blockchain 
technology will be explained through discussing the key fundamental characteristics of the 
technology in section 4.4 and lastly further advantages of the blockchain technology will be 
discussed in section 4.5. 
4.2 Classification of blockchain systems 
The blockchain technology is classified into three types, namely public blockchains, private 
blockchains and consortium blockchains (Buterin, 2015). The main characteristics of the 
classified blockchain systems are discussed below: 
4.2.1 Public blockchain 
Public blockchains have decentralised ledgers which are permissionless (O’Dair, Beaven, 
Neilson, Osbon & Pacifico, 2016). Public decentralised ledgers are available to all internet 
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users and are characterised by the fact that the public is able to participate unconditionally in 
the process of adding blocks to the chain (mining) and the current state of the blockchain 
(Buterin, 2015). The Bitcoin application is based on the traditional blockchain, and is an 
example of a public blockchain which utilises decentralised ledgers. 
4.2.2 Private blockchain 
Private blockchains are controlled by a single entity which results in a centralised network. 
Private blockchains have permissioned ledgers, which monitor write-permissions through 
centralised decision making, while read-permissions are either public or restricted by 
predetermined protocols (Buterin, 2015). The consensus process is controlled by specific 
pre-determined nodes. Furthermore, transactions are visible to the nodes in the blockchain, 
but not to the public.  
4.2.3 Consortium blockchain 
In a consortium blockchain the consensus process is determined by a selection of nodes. 
The ledger is seen to be somewhere between a public and a private ledger and is therefore 
considered to be partly decentralised (Pilkington, 2015).   
In summary: the type of blockchain system is determined by the specific blockchain 
application. The Bitcoin applications discussed in this chapter utilises public blockchains. 
The other types of blockchain systems are outside the scope of this study. 
4.3 Blockchain technology and Bitcoin application definitions (terminology) 
The following definitions are applicable to both the blockchain technology and the Bitcoin 
application. 
4.3.1 Blockchain participants (Nodes) 
Blockchain participants are known as nodes. A node is any device which is part of the 
blockchain network, and has a unique network address. Nodes in a blockchain network have 
the following characteristics: they are not identifiable and they can leave and rejoin the 
network at any stage during the process. Nodes have the ability to express their acceptance 
of valid blocks by working on extending the chain and can ultimately establish a single, but 
distributed, agreed history of each transaction (Nakamoto, 2008). The nodes in the Bitcoin 
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application who complete the consensus mechanism process are known as miners (refer to 
4.3.4 below). 
4.3.2 Decentralised network 
A decentralised network exists when various users connect to a blockchain network through 
a node which has an installed blockchain client. The nodes distribute data to the network 
after validating the data (Zheng, Xie, Dai & Wang, 2016). 
4.3.3 Blockchain fork 
A so-called fork is formed when a blockchain is split into two or more chains. A fork 
originates when two or more nodes publish a valid block at more or less the same time 
(refer to section 4.4.6 ii) (Swanson, 2015).  
4.3.4 Consensus mechanisms 
Consensus mechanisms are the processes whereby the transactions contained in a block 
are verified, after which the blocks are published. The consensus process is determined by 
the specific blockchain applications protocol. For the Bitcoin application, the nodes (miners) 
compete to solve a mathematical puzzle which requires computing power. When the puzzle 
is solved, the new block of transactions is added to the chain and accepted by the network. 
The miner is rewarded with newly generated coins (Vukolić, 2016). The proof-of-work 
consensus mechanism will be discussed in more detail in section 4.4.3. 
4.3.5 Nonce 
A nonce is an arbitrary number which is used only once in cryptographic communication. 
The nonce is part of the block header which is used by miners to solve the mathematical 
problem. Refer to section 4.4.3 where the function of the nonce during the consensus 
process will be discussed. 
4.3.6 Hash 
Hash functions are any functions which could be utilised to map data of random size to data 
of fixed size. For example, transaction data which is of random size are inputted into the 
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hash function to produce a hash value. The hash value or output consists of a fixed size of 
numbers and symbols determined by the hash function (Lewis, 2015).  
4.3.7 Merkle tree 
A Merkle tree root hash is a representation of the hash value of all the transactions in the 
block. The merkle tree root is calculated by using hash functions to calculate the hash values 
of all the leaves and eventually obtaining only one value for the root branch. Instead of 
storing entire transactions in the block header, only the Merkle root is included. The Merkle 
root is the root hash of the Merkle tree, which is calculated from all the transactions to be 
included in the block (Shudnov, 2012). 
4.3.8 Cryptographic algorithm 
Cryptography is used by the blockchain technology in two-fold, namely the verification 
process and the payment process. The specific cryptographic processes used by the 
blockchain technology are dependent on the protocol of the application of the blockchain 
technology. Two cryptographic processes are mainly used by the blockchain technology. 
They are known as digital signatures and cryptographic hash functions (Badev & Chen, 
2014). These cryptographic processes are discussed in section 4.4.1. 
4.3.9 Bitcoin application 
Bitcoin is described by Badev and Chen (2014) as a type of payment system because it also 
enables the transfer of value between parties. Traditional payment systems are based on the 
transfer of value which is denominated in a currency, for example Euro. Bitcoin, however, 
has its own metric of value, known as Bitcoin. Within a Bitcoin payment system, entities 
transact directly with each other without any mediation by a trusted third party, for example 
banks (Badev & Chen, 2014). 
4.3.10 Bitcoin 
Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency which is defined by general dictionary definitions as a digital 
currency which operates independently of a central bank or authority. The generation of the 
units of currency and the verification of the transfer of funds is regulated through encryption 
techniques. 
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Furthermore, Bitcoins are a fiduciary currency. Fiduciary currencies have no intrinsic value; 
their value is derived from either government fiat or from the belief that they may be 
accepted by other transacting parties. 
4.3.11 Peer-to-peer network 
A peer-to-peer network consists of Bitcoin miners which are informally connected without 
any central co-ordination. The Bitcoin protocol determines that all messages transmitted 
across the network needs to be shared with the network participants’ immediate peers. This 
result in transactions not being broadcasted to the entire network at the same time, but 
alternatively is shared haphazardly with random peers first, which is then shared to their 
peers, and so forth. 
4.4 Fundamental characteristics of the blockchain technology 
The blockchain technology will be explained through a discussion of the various levels in a 
blockchain transaction and the analysis of the characteristics of the blockchain technology in 
that specific level. 
The aim of this study was not to provide an in-depth analysis of the underlying technology 
but to explain the underlying buildings blocks that provide the foundation of the blockchain 
technology. As illustrated in Figure 4.1 below, a blockchain transaction is grouped into the 
following levels: 
Level 1:  Transaction initiation, which includes the following sublevels: 
i) Transaction encryption
ii) Verification of transactions
Level 2:  Transaction creation, to form online blocks, which include the following sublevels: 
i) Blockchain blocks content
ii) Timestamping
Level 3:  The block generation process, which includes one sublevel: 
i) Consensus mechanisms
Level 4:  The broadcasting of the block to the entire network 
Level 5:  Network participants approving and validating transactions 
Level 6: The block is added to the blockchain and the digital asset is transferred. The 
following sublevels are involved: 
i) Consensus mechanisms
ii) Blockchain maintenance
iii) Blockchain forking
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LEVEL 1: 
Transaction initiation  (A 
wants to transfer digital 
assets to B) 
LEVEL 2: 
 A candidate block 
is formed using 
valid transactions 
from (1). 
LEVEL 3: 
 Block generation 
LEVEL 4: 
 The block is broadcasted to 
the entire network.  
LEVEL 5: 
 Network participants approve and 
validate the block. 
LEVEL 6: 
 The block is added to 
the chain and the digital 
asset is transferred. 
Figure 4.1 The blockchain process 
Source: (Adapted from Kakavand, De Sevres & Chilton, 2017) 
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4.4.1  Transaction initiation (Level 1) 
Level 1, the initiation of a transaction, can be further analysed through the following two 
sublevels: the encryption of the transaction message through hashing and digital signatures, 
after which the encrypted transaction is broadcasted to the network; and the verification of 
the transaction, which is performed by the nodes in the network. Blockchains are based on 
two core cryptographic measures, namely cryptographic hash functions and digital 
signatures (Harz, 2017). Cryptographic hash functions are utilised to implement discipline 
when transaction records are recorded in the public ledger and digital signatures ensure 
accurate payment instructions between transacting parties. 
i) Transaction encryption (through hashing and digital signatures)
The initiation of a transaction takes place, for example, when an initiating party wants to 
transfer a digital asset (or assets) from a node’s address (or addresses) to another node’s 
address (or addresses), in the blockchain network (O’Diar et al., 2016). When transaction 
parties want to send the ‘message’ of the proposed transaction over the network, the 
transaction first needs to be encrypted. 
To ensure that the message is securely sent, the message needs to be encrypted by the 
initiating party. Encryption of information is one of the essential elements of digital security. 
Encryption is the translation of data, through using a mathematical algorithm, which ensures 
that the original data is concealed and only accessible to the intended recipients. The 
receiving party will decrypt the message to recover the original message. The algorithms for 
encryption and decryption are generally known, while the encryption and decryption keys are 
confidentially maintained. There are two types of encryption, namely symmetric encryption 
algorithms and cryptographic hashing. These encryption methods are discussed below 
(Harz, 2017). 
 Symmetric encryption algorithms
When data is encrypted using one-for-one translation, data is translated from one set of data 
to another set of data. When both transaction parties use the same key for encryption and 
decryption, it is known as a symmetric encryption algorithm (Skudnov, 2012). 
 Cryptographic hashing
Cryptographic hashing is the encryption method used by the blockchain technology. During 
the cryptographic hashing process, the contents of a transaction, including a few pieces of 
metadata, such as timestamps (refer to 4.4.2 ii) and transacting parties, are encrypted 
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through utilising a mathematical algorithm. The output is known as a hash, which is a short 
digest of the original data (Condos et al., 2016).  
A cryptographic hash function has the ability to take an input of random length, and provide 
an output, a sequence of predetermined length. A fundamental characteristic of the hash 
function is that the same hash will always be produced from the same input message. 
Furthermore, the hash will not be able to be reversed to the original message (Badev & 
Chen, 2014). A perfect cryptographic hash function, as discussed above, has the following 
characteristics (Rogaway & Shrimpton, 2004; Lewis, 2015):  
 It is very difficult to derive the original data from the hash function.
 When there are any changes to the original data, no matter how immaterial, the
hash will change significantly. The new hash is completely different from the old
hash and appears unrelated to the previous hash.
 A hash is unique, thus it is not possible for the same hash to be derived from two
different inputs.
These advantageous characteristics result in it being nearly impossible to determine, 
through guessing, what the original content of a hash was. The output of a hash function is 
very random and there is currently no known technique to reverse-engineer the original 
content from the calculated cryptographic hash. For example, envision a file containing a 
range of numbers, for example: 07 16 27 41 72 91. Hashing a document is similar to 
performing a mathematical calculation on the numbers. For example, the sum of the 
aforementioned numbers is 254. When given the sum of the numbers it is impossible to 
determine what the original numbers were. When one of the numbers in the range are 
changed, the hash will change. This is similar to the hashing of an electronic document, 
except the original input is thousands of numbers, and the mathematical calculation is more 
complex than a straightforward sum function. For example: take the sum, divide by 40, take 
the square root, add 80, and with 300 more steps (Condos et al., 2016). 
After the encryption of the transaction data, the message needs to be signed by the 
transacting (initiating) party, through the use of digital signatures. 
Digital signatures (Asymmetric cryptography) 
All transacting parties own a pair of keys, a private and a public key. Private keys are kept 
secret, similar to a password, and are used to sign messages. Public keys are visible to the 
network and are used to access the original message. These keys can be seen as digital 
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certificates that are stored on the user’s computer system, which allows for the encryption 
and decryption of data.  
Digital signatures are a form of asymmetric cryptography (they use one private and one 
public key), which is used in an untrusted environment as a mechanism to validate the 
authentication of transactions (Christidis & Devetsikiotis, 2016).  
To build a digital signature scheme, three algorithms are required (Harz, 2017): 
 an algorithm which will create a public and a private key. The two keys are paired, based
on their key size. The private key is used to sign messages, while the public key on the
message can be verified by anyone in the network;
 a sign algorithm which will create a signature, based on the private key, and a message;
and
 a verifying algorithm which will evaluate the validity of the message, based on the public
key, and the signature.
Figure 4.2 below shows an example of a digital signature used in a blockchain transaction. 
The digital signature is involved in two parts of the transaction: the signing and the 
verification part. For example, when a user A signs a transaction, she will firstly generate a 
hash value, which is calculated from the transaction. The calculated hash value will now be 
encrypted by using her private key, then she sends the encrypted hash, which includes the 
original data (the transaction), to user Bs (all the nodes in the network). User Bs (nodes in 
the network) will verify the received transaction through comparing the decrypted hash 
(through using user A’s public key) and the hash value of the received data (using the same 
hash function as user A). 
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Figure 4.2 The blockchain digital signature (Asymmetric cryptography) 
(Sources: (Author; Zheng et al., 2016)) 
Figure 4.2 The blockchain digital signature (Asymmetric cryptography) 
Source: (Adapted from Zheng et al., 2016) 
 
Nodes in the Network  (B’s) 
Transaction 
message 
Hash 
Di1345664s
81
Encryption 
Private 
Key 
Transaction 
message 
Di1345664s
81
S
E
N
D
I
N
G Di1345664s
81
Transaction 
message 
Decryption 
Hash 
VERIFICATION 
? = Accept 
or Reject 
Di1345664s
81
Di1345664s
81
User A 
Encypted Hash 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
30 
Therefore, a valid digital signature results in the authentication and validation of a 
transaction. The validation of the transaction illustrates and confirms that the transaction was 
created by a known sender, the sender cannot deny sending the transaction, and the 
message was not altered in transit. 
Therefore, digital signatures are utilised to ensure that a message between a sender and a 
receiver is validated (Badev & Chen, 2014). Through the validation of the message the 
following risks are addressed: 
 authentication – the recipient can verify that the message came from the sender;
 non-repudiation – the sender cannot deny sending the message; and
 integrity – the message has not been altered or edited in transit.
Bitcoin application 
The initiation of a transaction occurs, for example, when an initiation party wants to transfer 
Bitcoins to another party within the Bitcoin network. Entities generally own a set of Bitcoin 
addresses, called their wallet, which is used for transacting on the Bitcoin network. Each 
transaction record will consist of one or more sending addresses and one or more receiving 
addresses and the amount of Bitcoins sent and received per address will differ. Thus there is 
a possibility of multiple receiving addresses from one Bitcoin sending address. This process 
is illustrated in Figure 4.3 below. 
Figure 4.3 A Bitcoin transaction 
Source: (Badev & Chen, 2014) 
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From the Bitcoin transaction illustrated in Figure 4.3, two important features are noted, 
namely that serial numbers cannot be assigned to Bitcoins to trace their path in the Bitcoin 
network, since there are multiple sending and receiving addresses per transaction. 
Secondly, even though the ledger is public, the changing of ownership of Bitcoins cannot be 
directly observed since the identity of the network nodes are protected and only public keys 
are visible (Badev & Chen, 2014). 
During the Bitcoin transaction process, cryptography is used by the Bitcoin application in 
three fold, namely the verification process; the payment process; and to manage the number 
of Bitcoins (Badev & Chen, 2014).  
The cryptographic hash function utilised by the Bitcoin application is SHA-256, which is a 
type of secure hash algorithm. SHA-256 was designed by the National Security Agency and 
published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (Dang, 2012). 
The type of digital signatures used by the Bitcoin application is called the elliptical curve 
digital signature algorithm (ECDSA). Elliptic curve digital signature algorithms have several 
advantages, including smaller key sizes and faster computation, while the security factor 
quality remains the same (Skudnov, 2012). 
For the Bitcoin application, the public key of the digital signature is used to identify the users. 
A user can create identities or addresses and is allowed to create multiple addresses 
(Nakamoto, 2008; Wood, 2014). On the other hand, in permissioned blockchains, the 
process of creating identities is controlled by a membership service which authorises new 
identities (Cachin, 2016). 
The Bitcoin balance of every Bitcoin address is public information and can be calculated by 
any participant in the Bitcoin network, because the transaction history is recorded in a public 
ledger. Therefore, every previous or proposed (newly broadcasted) transaction can be 
verified and the availability of the proposed amount of Bitcoins for a particular Bitcoin 
address can be confirmed by the network nodes (Badev & Chen, 2014). 
To conclude, the sender uses its key to encrypt the transaction data. The transaction will 
now be broadcasted to the entire network for the verification process to start. The verification 
process is discussed below. 
ii) Transactions are broadcasted to the network and verification process can start
The digitally signed transactions are broadcasted to all the participating nodes in the 
network. The recipients in the network, receiving the encrypted message, use their public 
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keys to decrypt the information and validate the transaction based on the blockchain 
protocol. The transactions are recorded in the public ledger after the verification process.  
The process during which the integrity of a transaction is verified and the availability of funds 
is confirmed, is a complex process. The maintenance of records and the verification of 
transactions are regarded as a central part of any electronic payment system. These 
functions are generally performed through private ledgers which are maintained by trusted 
third parties. A decentralised payment system, such as Bitcoin, replaces third party 
intermediaries and the records are maintained in a public ledger through a distributed 
information system. The public ledger allows for a decentralised approach in the verification 
of transaction messages (Badev & Chen, 2014). 
When transactions are verified, the following needs to be checked by the verifying nodes: 
 The digital asset is owned by the spender, which is checked through ensuring that
the transaction was signed by the initiating party, known as ‘digital signature
verification of transactions’.
 The spender (initiating party) has a sufficient amount of the digital asset (for example
cryptocurrencies) in his account. This will be checked through checking every
transaction performed on the spender’s account or ‘public key’ which is registered in
the ledger. This process will ensure that the spender has an adequate amount of the
specific digital asset in his account to complete and finalise the transaction (Crosby
et al., 2016).
Bitcoin application 
The Merkle tree is utilised to verify transactions in the Bitcoin application. As discussed in 
section 4.4.2 i) the block consists of a block header which includes a Merkle tree root hash.  
Bitcoin utilises the Merkle tree structure through a method known as ‘simplified payment 
verification’ (SPV). Franco (2014) concluded that through applying the block header, Bitcoin 
proposes an easier way to verify whether a transaction should be included in a block or not. 
The block header is formed through the Merkle root, which includes the nonce (included by 
the miner) and the hash of the previous block (Franco, 2014). Each SPV client maintains 
copies of the block headers from the longest proof-of-work chain, which could be obtained 
through enquiry to the network until the SPV client is satisfied that it has the longest chain, 
which is regarded as the valid chain (refer to section 4.4.3). When an SPV client wants to 
verify that a specific transaction belongs in the block, they will be able to download a specific 
branch in the Merkle tree. This specific branch in the Merkle tree, which includes the 
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connection between particular transactions to the specific block header, named a Merkle 
branch, will be used to validate the transaction (Levin, 2017).  
4.4.2 Candidate blocks are formed using validated transactions (Level 2) 
After transactions have been initiated, encrypted through cryptographic hashing and digital 
signatures, broadcasted to the network, and validated by the network participants, these 
transactions are now valid. Nodes in the network will now group transactions into blocks.  
In Level 2, the blockchain blocks are discussed, which includes the contents of a block, 
namely the block header, block body and the timestamping of blocks. 
i) Blockchain blocks
Firstly, a block is a file in which data, for example transactions or events, are recorded 
(Condos et al., 2016). These blocks are added together to form a blockchain, which then 
constitutes a complete list of all the transactional records (Chuen, 2015). In this string or 
chain of blocks, every block refers to the previous block through a reference known as a 
hash value. The previous block is called the parent block, while the first block of a blockchain 
is referred to as the genesis block. Figure 4.4 is a simplified explanation of a blockchain. The 
first block is known as the genesis block, the sequence of blocks is ordered backward, 
based on the hash value of the previous blocks. 
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Figure 4.4 An example of a blockchain 
Source: (Zheng et al., 2016) 
Blocks, which contain the transaction information, are used to match information across all nodes in the network. The content of a block is 
grouped together as a block header and a block body (Zheng et al., 2016). 
Block header (header hash) 
A block header (or a header hash) is a hash value calculated from the information included in a block’s header. This header hash is used by the 
next block to link back to the previous block. The content of the header hash in the blockchain application is dependent on the specific 
blockchain application protocol. The following are the minimum contents of a block header: 
 Blockchain version number, which specifies which set of ‘consensus rules’ should be followed;
 Header hash of the previous block;
 Merkle tree root hash, which is the hash value of all the transactions in the block;
 Timestamp (current ‘timestamp’ as seconds in universal time since 1 January 1970);
 nBits (compact representation of the ‘target’ of a valid block hash); and
 The ‘nonce’ (the value which will be changed during the consensus process to obtain the ‘target’ hash. It is a 4-byte field,
generally starts with 0, and increases with every hash calculation).
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All transactions are not included in the block header, only the Merkle root is. The Merkle root 
is the root hash of the Merkle tree, which is calculated using all the transactions to be 
included in the block as input to the hash function. A Merkle tree is a binary tree which is 
formed through using hash values. One of the major advantages of Merkle trees is the 
verification of transactions. When a node wants to verify that a transaction belongs to a block 
on the blockchain, the node does not need to recalculate the hashes of the entire chain, but 
only the hashes from the leaf and upwards towards the root branch (Levin, 2017). 
A Merkle tree is generated by performing the following procedures: first, hashes of all the 
transactions are calculated; then these calculated hashes are paired together and hashed 
again, resulting in a new, smaller group of hashes. This step is repeated numerous times 
until only one hash is left. Finally, this hash, which is called the root hash, or the Merkle root, 
is included in the block header (Skudnov, 2012). The precise procedure for calculating the 
Merkle tree was beyond the scope of this study. Figure 4.5 below provides an example of 
the contents of a block. 
Block version 02000000 
Previous block header hash B6ffob1b1680a2862a30ca44d346d9cB910d3
34beb48cac00000000 
Merkle tree root hash 9d10aa52ee949386ca9385695f04ede270dda
20810decd12bc9b048aaab31471 
Timestamp 24d95a54 
nBits 30c31b18 
Nonce Fe9f0864 
Figure 4.5 An illustration of the contents of a block 
Source: (Zheng et al., 2016) 
Block body 
The block body includes the number and collection of transactions. The validation of these 
transactions is discussed above, in section 4.4.1 ii) (Level 1). 
Number of transactions (TX) 
TX..1 TX..2 TX..n 
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ii) Timestamping
A timestamp is the connection between the individual blocks. The timing of a transaction in 
the blockchain and the recording thereof is a critical step in the forming of the blockchain. 
During the verification process, a node will check (among other things) timestamps of 
previous transactions. This is done to ensure that transacting parties attempting to transact 
and record the same unit twice, at for example at 12:00 and 12:01 will be regarded as invalid 
by the nodes in the network during the validation process. Furthermore, timestamping 
enables data stored in the blockchain to be stored in chronological order. The timestamp of 
the current block also refers back to the timestamp of the previous transactions, resulting in 
a ‘chain’ of transactions. Individual timestamps are furthermore encrypted and obtained from 
a trusted timestamp server. Consequently, each block which are added to the chain is 
mathematically linked to the previous block, as well as to the subsequent blocks (Condos et 
al., 2016). 
 4.4.3 The block-generation process, through consensus mechanisms (Level 3) 
After transactions have been created and validated in Level 1 and a block is formed by the 
nodes in the network in Level 2, the block needs to be generated and added to the 
blockchain. This is performed by participants or nodes which will compete to record the 
transaction in the blockchain (Badev & Chen, 2014). A system is required to ensure that the 
‘correct’ block is added to the blockchain, as there could be multiple blocks created by 
different nodes at the same time. The blocks in the blockchain are generated through a 
consensus process. The Bitcoin blockchain relies extensively on hashes and hash functions 
during the consensus process (Pilkington, 2015). The consensus process is performed 
through the use of a mathematical puzzle, whereby blocks would only be accepted to the 
blockchain once a very special mathematical problem is solved. For example, a node will be 
required to find a nonce which will provide a hash with a certain number of leading zeros 
when it is hashed with both transactions and hashes of the previous blocks (Crosby et al., 
2016). The mathematical puzzle which needs to be solved by the node is adjusted to ensure 
that a block in the network takes more or less 10 minutes to be generated by a node. There 
is still a very small probability that more than one block will be generated by two nodes at a 
specific point in time, which will result in a fork (Crosby et al., 2016). (Refer to a discussion of 
forks in section 4.4.6 ii.)  
A distributed method to mitigate the forks in a blockchain is required because various nodes 
might have different views of the network. There are different approaches to obtain 
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consensus. The following six mechanisms are representative of modern consensus 
algorithms (Vukolić, 2016): 
 Proof of work (POW)
In short, the proof-of-work process requires a node wanting to generate a block to
prove that it has sufficient computing resources to solve a mathematical puzzle.
 Proof of stake (POS)
Proof of stake is a consensus mechanism in which the generation of blocks depends
on the amount of currency owned by the nodes. Verification is performed by the nodes
with the highest stake in the network; hence the nodes with the largest amount of
currency will perform the verification process. This is based on the assumption that the
nodes with the highest stake would ensure that the verification process is performed
correctly because this is in their best interest.
 Practical byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT)
Practical byzantine fault tolerance was initially a system devised for a storage system,
it could be utilised in digital asset management, which does not require a large amount
of throughput, but does demand many transactions. Through PBFT, each node in the
network will publish a public key. The node will sign the message coming through to
verify its format. The transaction is regarded valid when sufficient identical responses
are reached. Thus trust is confirmed through the total number of nodes agreeing to the
transaction and no hashing power is required as per POW.
 Delegated proof of stake (DPOS )
Delegated proof of stake is similar to POS, whereby nodes are able to create blocks
based on their stake (amount of currency held by them). The difference between
DPOS and POS is that in DPOS the stakeholders are able to choose delegates who
may generate and validate a block.
 Deposit-based POS
In deposit-based consensus protocols participants are required to register a security
deposit for them to be able to provide the consensus for producing blocks.
 Roundrobin
Roundrobin is used for private blockchains. There is consequently an amount of trust
between the participants and consensus is achieved without difficult computations.
The specific blockchain protocol determines the consensus mechanism which needs to be 
performed by network participants (Pilkington, 2015). The Bitcoin application utilises the 
POW consensus mechanism for the block-generation process (Level 3), which is discussed 
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below. The detailed working of the other modern consensus mechanisms, named above, is 
beyond the scope of this study. 
Bitcoin application 
As discussed above, digital signatures are utilised to verify that the transaction was signed 
by the transacting party claiming to be signing the message. However, this does not solve 
the problem that one person might send the same bitcoin twice, since it is possible to create 
valid signatures for both transactions (Nakamoto, 2008). In a decentralised system such as 
Bitcoin, network participants need to agree on the validity of transaction to prevent double-
spending. This is done through a distributed consensus protocol.  
A distributed consensus protocol includes the following factors: a network has ‘x’ nodes of 
which an arbitrary ‘k’ number of nodes might be faulty or malicious. The consensus protocol 
needs to ensure that firstly, all honest nodes agree with one value, as well as the 
transactions in a block, and secondly, that this value was created by honest nodes. Bitcoin 
utilises the consensus algorithm, Proof of work (POW), which is based on the fact that the 
chain with the most computational work is regarded to be the valid chain (Nakamoto, 2008).   
The Bitcoin POW consensus mechanism is activated by nodes which compete to record the 
transactions in the blockchain. The nodes are called miners and the processes when the 
nodes compete to add a block to the blockchain are known as mining. The Bitcoins’ POW 
consensus mechanism is based on hashcash. Hashcash is a type of POW system which 
aims to ensure that competing computers use a defined number of computing resources to 
reach a predetermined target (Back, 2002; Nakamoto, 2008; Franco, 2014). 
To reach the predetermined target, a complicated computational process is used for the 
validation of transactions. During this computational process, also known as the hash 
function, each miner in the network will calculate a hash value of the constantly changing 
block header. As explained in section 4.3.5, a nonce is a value starting from 0 which 
increases with each hash calculation. The POW consensus mechanism determines that the 
calculated value be equal to or smaller than a certain target value. For Bitcoin, which utilises 
a decentralised network, miners have to calculate the hash value continuously by using 
different nonces until the target hash value is reached. The hash target is determined by the 
blockchain protocol, which is a range of predetermined criteria.  
If the hash value produced is below a certain threshold, the POW is complete and the 
transaction has been verified. If the target hash value has not been reached, the miner 
needs to try again through using another value for the nonce. Miners are forced to cycle 
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through a series of nonce values on a trial and error basis because it is impossible to 
determine whether the value of the nonce, when combined with the other two inputs, will 
result in a acceptable hash value. For example, the Bitcoin protocol requires that miners 
combine three inputs and enter them into a SHA-256 hash function by including the 
following: 
 a reference to the previous block;
 details of their proposed block of transactions; and
 a special number called a nonce.
When the appropriate value is obtained by a miner, the block is timestamped and all other 
nodes need to confirm the accuracy of the value. The range of transactions used for the 
calculation is the validated result, which is used by the new block in the blockchain. 
The POW consensus mechanism utilised by the Bitcoin application causes the time taken to 
successfully verify a block of transactions to vary depending on the difficulty of obtaining the 
correct nonce. The time duration for the verification of a block will decrease when for 
example new miners connect to the blockchain network, or existing miners invest in faster 
computers. In order to allow time for information of each successful block to spread across 
the entire network, the difficulty of obtaining the correct nonce is periodically adjusted (Velde, 
2013). This is done to ensure that the average time for adding blocks to the chain remains 
approximately stable at 10 minutes, resulting in payments not being instantaneous. This 
adjustment is done every two weeks to ensure that the rate at which blocks are added to the 
chain is six times per hour. Thus, if more miners are added to the network, the computing 
power will increase, resulting in the increased difficulty of resolving the mathematical 
problems in a timely manner (Velde, 2013). 
To prevent fraudulent transactions on the blockchain, the adding of a block to the chain is an 
expensive process. ‘Expensive’, in terms of mining, refers to computer hardware required, 
electricity consumed and time expended. For POW schemes, the mathematical problem is 
difficult to solve, but the solution is easy to verify (Velde, 2013). Because the solution is easy 
to verify, the POW consensus system is balanced in favour of transaction verification, 
resulting in fraudulent transaction being easily identified. 
The consensus process, known as mining for the Bitcoin blockchain, during which the nodes 
compete to add the block to the blockchain, is illustrated In Figure 4.6 below. A hash, called 
a digest, is obtained through inputting the data of a block of newly broadcasted transactions 
into the cryptographic hash function. The digest, together with a nonce, are inputted into 
another hash function, which result in a blockchain hash of the new block. The task that the 
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nodes need to solve consists of finding a nonce, which will result in the blockchain hash for 
the new block having certain properties (target hash). When the first node finds the nonce to 
solve the problem and reach the target hash, it is broadcasted to the rest of the network and 
the ledger is updated (Badev & Chen, 2014). 
Digest 
Figure 4.6 The consensus mechanism – mining process 
Source: (Back, 2002) 
Miner incentives and Bitcoin supply 
The POW algorithm which is used as a consensus mechanism in Bitcoin is fundamental to 
the validation of transactions; hence, the miners performing this process are currently 
rewarded for their participation. The rewards are two-fold: firstly, a transaction fee is paid to 
miners, and secondly, newly generated Bitcoins are rewarded to miners who successfully 
solve the mathematical problem (Badev & Chen, 2014).  
Block N 
Block 
Header 
Block Body 
Hash 
function 
Digest 
Hash 
function 
Hash of last 
blockchain 
block 
Hash of 
new block 
Nonce 
To be 
calculate by 
the miner 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
41 
Transacting parties has the option to include a transaction fee; this fee will be distributed to 
the miner who successfully adds to the block to the blockchain (Velde, 2013). Initially, 
Nakamoto (2008) included the transaction fees with the idea that this would replace the 
newly minted Bitcoin reward to miners. The transaction fees are however not compulsory 
and willingly allocated by the sender of the transaction and currently this is an insignificant 
portion of the overall reward.  
The reward of newly generated Bitcoins was initially 50, but the reward is halved every 
210 000 blocks (which is every four years based on an average rate of six blocks per hour). 
This confirms that the total number of Bitcoins will increase to, but never exceed, 21 million. 
Thus, mining is becoming unprofitable for miners (Velde, 2013) and is considered to be a 
risk for the validation process of the Bitcoin application. Additional risks are discussed in 
more detail in chapter five. 
4.4.4 The block is broadcasted to the entire network (Level 4) 
After the block has been generated and the target hash solved, the block is broadcasted to 
the entire network. Before the block is added to the network, the network participants need 
to approve and validate the block, as explained in section 4.4.5 below. 
4.4.5 Network participants approve and validate the block (Level 5) 
The verification by the rest of the network that ‘proper work’ was done by the node is a very 
simple and a fast process since the inputs have to be hashed only once to determine if the 
output has the correct number of leading zeros and consequently confirming that the target 
has been reached. 
The following steps are performed to confirm that a block is valid (Buterin, 2015): 
 Check if the previous block, referenced by the current block, exists and is valid.
 Check that the timestamp of the block is greater than that of the previous block.
 Check that the POW on the block is valid.
If the validity of the block has been confirmed, the new block, which contains the grouped 
transactions, is added to the public ledger of the version of the blockchain held by the 
specific node who solved the mathematical problem. Acceptance of the block by the network 
participants is indicated by the nodes through working on creating a new block in the chain 
and by using the hash of the previous (accepted) block in the generation of the new block. 
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4.4.6 The block is added to the blockchain and the digital asset is transferred (Level 
6) 
After the block has been added to the network and the transaction is completed, it is 
important that the public ledger is maintained. 
i) Blockchain maintenance
The determining factor for a valid ledger is the ledger which required the most cumulative 
work to be generated. The ‘work’ that is performed by the nodes is a function of the difficulty 
in obtaining an acceptable nonce which produces the predetermined target and the hash 
(discussed above in section 4.4.3). The work that is done to encrypt a block, through 
computational power, is also added to the overall work of the blockchain to which it is added 
(Badev & Chen, 2014). The incremental difficulty of a block is based on the number of 
leading zeros in its nonce. With the increase in the number of leading zeros of the nonce, the 
incremental difficulty of the block increases. The cumulative difficulty of the blockchain is 
furthermore determined by the sum of the incremental difficulty of all the blocks in a chain. In 
Figure 4.7 below, ‘d’ indicates the incremental difficulty of each block. 
The process of reaching consensus on the correct, valid ledger is demonstrated in Figure 
4.7. Assume that Block A is the current block and the nodes are competing to add to this 
block. The successful node will broadcast a new block B to the network, which will be added 
to the chain, adding to its difficulty. The blockchain with the highest cumulative difficulty will 
be considered the valid ledger. Therefore, an attacker wanting to manipulate the ledger will 
need to produce a ledger with a higher cumulative difficulty than the main, validated ledger. 
This is highly unlikely, since the attacker will only be successful if he has the ability to obtain 
more computational power than all the other nodes in the network (Badev & Chen, 2014). 
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Figure 4.7 Blockchain maintenance 
Source: (Badev & Chen, 2014) 
ii) Blockchain forking
In a decentralised network, branches or forks may form as a result of the fact that valid blocks are generated simultaneously by numerous 
nodes finding the right nonce at more or less the same time. These branches or forks are shown in Figure 4.8 below.  
Figure 4.8 Blockchain forks 
Source: (Johnson & Vanstone, 2001) 
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The POW protocol stipulates that the longest chain generated after the fork is regarded to be 
the valid chain. Generally, when more or less six blocks are generated, the relevant 
blockchain is regarded to be validated (Johnson & Vanstone, 2001). For example, by 
referring to figure 4.8, assume blocks B11 and G11 were validated simultaneously. Nodes 
will work on both the forks to add new blocks to both of them. But when B12 is added to B11, 
miners that were working on G11–G12 will switch to B12 and continue with that chain. Block 
G11–G12 is known as orphan blocks.  
Bitcoin application 
The maintenance of the Bitcoin blockchain could be jeopardised through possible attacks on 
the Bitcoin network. A possible way the system can be attacked is through obtaining 
sufficient computing power to be able to verify fraudulent transactions. This would however 
result in trust problems for the entire system which will consequently result in the decrease 
of the value of possible Bitcoins the attacker could steal. It therefore would be more sensible 
for anyone who is able to obtain sufficient computing power to rather contribute to the 
system than attacking it (Levin, 2017). 
An example of an attack on the Bitcoin system would be an attempt to build a fraudulent 
chain faster than the honest chain is originating. However, this attack would most likely fail 
because honest nodes would not accept an invalid transaction or add a block to the 
blockchain that contains invalid transaction. An alternative form of an attack would be for an 
attacker to adjust their own transaction history, thus trying to respend coins used in previous 
transactions (Levin, 2017). 
Nakamoto (2008) argues that the race between honest and fraudulent chains can be viewed 
as a Binomial Random Walk. The process can furthermore be seen as an attempt to catch 
up continuously. When the honest chain validates a block which is added to the chain, the 
gap between the honest and the fraudulent chain is extended by +1. Furthermore, for each 
block that is added to the attacker’s chain the gap is decreased by -1. This process is similar 
to the Gambler’s Ruin Problem, which in short, is the calculation of the probability of an 
attacker to catch up to the honest chain from a certain deficit. For example, if a gambler with 
an unlimited credit starts off with a deficit and plays an infinite number of games, with the 
goal of trying to break even, it will be possible to calculate the probability that the gambler 
has to break even, or in the case of blockchain, for the attacker from the fraudulent chain to 
catch up to the honest chain (Levin, 2017).  
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As discussed above, there are ways to attack the Bitcoin network but the probability of 
succeeding is low in large blockchains such as Bitcoin, where the computational power 
required to process fraudulent transactions is very high. 
4.5 Further advantages of the blockchain technology 
The blockchain characteristics discussed above are the specific characteristics identified 
which could potentially address the significant risks with the exchange of digital assets, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. However, the blockchain technology has further characteristics and 
advantages which could be beneficial to any user implementing the technology in various 
industries. 
The list of benefits provided below is not an exhaustive list, but includes what is regarded to 
be the most important advantages differentiating this new technology innovation from other 
current technology innovations. 
 Redundancy
Decentralised networks used by the blockchain technology are more durable than 
centralised networks because the risks are distributed between all the nodes and are not 
subject to single point of failure as per a centralised network (Abeyratne & Monfared, 2016). 
 Anonymity
Users or entities interacting with the Bitcoin blockchain network utilises a generated address 
(through the public key), which does not disclose the identity of the user of entity. Even 
though complete privacy preservation cannot be guaranteed, this mechanism ensures a 
certain amount of privacy on the transactions included in the blockchain (Shrier, Larossi, 
Sharma & Pentland, 2016). 
 Auditability
Verification and tracing previous records are made possible through timestamps and the fact 
that any node in the distributed network can be accessed. This undoubtedly improves the 
traceability and the transparency of the data stored in the blockchain (Shrier et al., 2016). 
 Availability
The network of participating nodes makes the blockchain and its contents highly available to 
users, regardless of their location (Wilson, 2016). Blockchain enables transactions to be 
processed unconditionally, without limitations to aspects such as time and location. This 
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availability could be utilised for automated interactions which will result in decreasing or even 
eliminating transaction costs. 
 Transparency
All transactions executed on the blockchain are visible to the public, making it possible for all 
nodes to agree on the status of the ledger (Wilson, 2016). 
 Permissionless
The Bitcoin network is permissionless, thus no registration is required before participants 
can start transacting or mining (Wilson, 2016). 
4.6  Conclusion 
The characteristics of the blockchain technology were discussed in this chapter through 
explaining the various levels in a blockchain transaction. The Bitcoin application was utilised 
as an example of the blockchain technology to further enhance the understanding of the 
characteristics of the underlying technology. 
In summary, this chapter found the following: the Bitcoin application and the underlying 
blockchain technology is a unique technology innovation which can be differentiated from 
other distributed systems by two characteristics. Firstly, Bitcoin attempts to ensure that each 
transaction is transparent, which will complicate falsification, and secondly, Bitcoin proposes 
a solution to the double-spending problem through utilising a peer-to-peer network together 
with consensus algorithms and a distributed timestamp server. Each transaction is 
timestamped and hashed into a continuous chain of hashes, by making use of the POW 
consensus algorithm. This results in blocks which cannot be adjusted by external parties 
without reperforming the POW (Levin, 2017). 
In chapter five, the findings of how the characteristics of the blockchain technology, as 
discussed in this chapter, address the most significant identified risks with the exchange of 
digital asset, as discussed in chapter three are mapped. Additional risks were also identified 
during the mapping process, which users need to consider before implementing blockchain 
technology. 
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CHAPTER 5.  HOW BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY ADDRESSES THE IDENTIFIED KEY 
RISKS AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE REMAINING (Additional) RISKS 
5.1 Introduction 
A discussion follows on how to manage the four main risks identified when digital assets are 
exchanged, as discussed in chapter three. This is done by discussing the current available 
technological developments which are aimed at addressing these identified risks. Next, the 
specifically designed blockchain technology characteristics, as discussed in chapter four, are 
mapped to these identified risks. As a result of the abovementioned mapping performed, a 
summary of the remaining, unaddressed or so-called additional risks is also included.  
5.2 Risks identified when digital assets are exchanged 
The procedures in addressing the identified risks, as noted in chapter three, are discussed 
using traditional controls. This is followed by a discussion on how the specific blockchain 
technology characteristics identified in chapter four could potentially address these risks in a 
possibly more effective and efficient manner. 
These results are summarised in Table 5.1 where the blockchain characteristics are mapped 
to the identified risk. This was furthermore linked to the control objective achieved when the 
specific risk is addressed. 
5.2.1 Trust 
Traditional procedures addressing the trust risk 
Currently, all internet commerce, which includes the exchanged of digital assets, is 
exclusively linked to a financial institution, central bank or central trusted agency. These 
trusted third parties process and mediate transactions, including the validation, safeguarding 
and preservation of transactions (Crosby et al., 2016). Because a certain percentage of 
fraud is unavoidable in online transactions (including digital asset exchange), mediation is 
needed, which is currently supplied by a trusted third party. This results in high transaction 
costs and possible bottlenecks at central servers (Crosby et al., 2016). 
Blockchain characteristics addressing the trust risk 
With blockchain technology, each transaction is collectively verified and validated by the 
network participants, resulting in the elimination of intermediaries. Furthermore, the 
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transacting parties do not need to trust each other since the transaction is publicly processed 
in the network by all network participants. 
The following blockchain-specific characteristics address the trust risk: 
• Peer-to-peer network, through which all transactions processed on the blockchain
are public, resulting in no intermediary being required to ensure trust between
transacting parties (Nakamoto, 2008).
• Distributed ledgers, which provide greater traceability and transparency, resulting in
increased trust, without a trusted third party governing the transacting process (Shrier
et al., 2016);
• Consensus process, whereby data is validated and grouped into blocks, which are
only added to the chain after consensus is reached by the nodes in the blockchain
(Lorenz et al., 2016).
5.2.2 Double-spending 
Traditional procedures addressing the double-spending problem 
Even though digital signatures are currently trying to address the double-spending problem, 
a trusted third party is still required to try to prevent double-spending of digital assets 
(Nakamoto, 2008). 
Blockchain characteristics addressing the double-spending problem 
Blockchain is the first solution to the double-spending problem that does not require a central 
administrator or clearing agent (Lorenz et al., 2016). 
The double-spending problem is one of the main issues that blockchain is aiming to solve, 
through the following: 
• Asymmetric cryptography as identified by Pilkington (2015): Asymmetric
cryptography, of which digital signatures are an example, is used to ensure the
validity of digital messages. Asymmetric cryptography therefore ensures validity,
integrity and non-repudiation of transactions (Christidis & Devetsikiotis, 2016). Digital
signatures specifically address unauthorised transactions, as private keys of network
participants would need to be stolen before unauthorised transactions can be
processed;
 Timestamping of transactions during the validation process (Nakamoto, 2008): The
validation process includes the agreement by the nodes in the network on the order
of transactions (Lemieux, 2016);
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 Immutability of blocks: After blocks are added to the chain it is very difficult to modify
them. To modify previous broadcasted blocks would be computationally infeasible as
this would require the overtaking of the rate at which new blocks are currently added
to the chain in order to re-write the entire history (Wilson, 2016).
5.2.3 Repudiation 
Traditional procedures addressing the risk of repudiation 
Currently, one of the fundamental instruments in digital security is the encryption of 
information through digital signatures or e-sign technologies. Digital signatures entail the 
translation of one piece of data into another through utilising a mathematical algorithm, to 
ensure that the original data is concealed and can only be accessed by the intended users 
(Condos et al., 2016). E-sign technologies work on a similar basis, as public and private 
keys which are used for the encryption and decryption of data are stored on a user’s 
computer system (Condos et al., 2016).  
Blockchain characteristic addressing the risk of repudiation 
Even though participants in the Bitcoin blockchain have anonymity, repudiation of 
transactions is still addressed through the following characteristics: 
• Asymmetric cryptography (refer to 5.2.2);
• Cryptographic hashing, which is an encryption method that is similar to traditional
encryption methods used. Cryptographic hashing ensures the encryption of the
contents of a transaction, through a mathematical algorithm (Christidis &
Devetsikiotis, 2016); and
• Immutability of blocks, the fact that approved records cannot be altered, which
furthermore addresses the non-repudiation risk and specifically discrepancies and
ensures that transactions cannot be altered after initial processing (Wilson, 2016).
5.2.4 Theft (including fraud) 
Traditional procedures addressing the risk of theft (including fraud) 
Encryption of information, through digital signatures, is currently mostly used to address theft 
and fraud of digital assets. Furthermore, fraud is seen to be limited through mediation by a 
trusted third party (Crosby et al., 2016).  
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Blockchain characteristic addressing the risk of theft (including fraud) 
The blockchain innovation, which ensures that transactions are computationally impractical 
to reverse, results in the protection of sellers against fraud (Nakamoto, 2008). Although fraud 
will never be completely addressed by this method, the following characteristics of 
blockchain are aimed at decreasing the risk: 
• Decentralised network: Because all or most of the nodes in the blockchain network
have a copy of the valid chain, an attacker will not be able to negatively influence the
entire system. This was confirmed through research performed by Nath (2016), who
noted that the blockchain technology could be utilised to decrease fraud resulting
from the integrity of any asset. As the integrity of the asset is maintained by various
nodes, counterfeiting, double spending or document alternations are minimised.
• Consensus process: Resulting from the size of the Bitcoin blockchain the computing
power required to launch an attack would be very high and are therefore regarded as
impractical (Condos et al., 2016). The attackers would need to introduce the
fraudulent transaction, ensure that a block is published from the generated
transaction through solving a mathematical puzzle, and subsequently compete
against the ‘good’ nodes to generate further blocks to ensure the network accepts the
transaction and the block as valid. The fact that the blockchain is linked
cryptographically makes the processing of fraudulent transactions even more difficult
(Crosby et al., 2016).
• Immutability: Each transaction is broadcasted to the entire network, which then
validates and records the transaction in blocks. After a block is added to the
blockchain, it cannot be modified and falsification is difficult. No block (entry) can be
deleted or reversed once it has been added to the chain and is stored in the
distributed network (Abeyratne & Monfared, 2016; Wilson, 2016). Therefore,
blockchain is very effective in the prevention of objective information fraud, for
example loan application fraud, where fraudulent information is fact-based. (Chai &
Zhu, 2016).
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
51 
Table 5.1 Matrix of the blockchain technology characteristics mapped to the significant risks identified and control objectives 
achieved through the technology 
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authorised 
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Level 1: Transaction 
encryption 
 Cryptographic
hashing X X X X 
 Digital signatures
(Asymmetric
cryptography) X X X X 
X X 
Level 1: Verification of 
transactions 
 Broadcasted to
network – peer-to-
peer network
X X X 
 Validation/Verifi-
cation process
(Decentralised)
X X X X X 
SIGNIFICANT RISKS IDENTIFIED CONTROL OBJECTIVES 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
52 
Blockchain 
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Level 2: Blockchain block 
content 
 Previous block
header hash X X X X 
 Immutability of
blocks X X X X X X 
 Timestamping X X X 
Level 3: The block 
generation process 
 Proof of work
X X X 
Level 4:Broadcasting of 
block 
 Decentralised
public network X X X X 
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Sub-categories if risks 
identified 
Reliability Authenticity Fraud Discrepancies 
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transactions 
Theft 
Level 5: Transaction 
validation 
Network participants 
approving and validating 
transactions 
X X X 
Level 6: Maintenance 
Blockchain maintenance  - 
block is added to the 
chain (distributed ledgers) X X X X X X 
Source:  (Author’s own construct) 
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5.3  Remaining and additional risks of the blockchain technology 
The blockchain technology is a breakthrough technology with many possible applications in 
financial as well as non-financial sector. Even though the blockchain application addresses 
many risks, there are still additional risks which users need to take into consideration when 
adopting the technology (Crosby et al., 2016). 
The additional risks, identified through mapping performed in step 3 and other risks identified 
during research performed in step 1.2, were grouped together to provide a list of additional 
risks users need to consider before implementing the blockchain technology. 
5.3.1 Underlying costs 
The consensus mechanism, POW, which is utilised in the Bitcoin system to verify 
transactions, results in relatively high costs. These costs are caused by electricity and 
hardware charges to solve the mathematical problem during the validation process (Decker 
& Wattenhofer, 2013; Levin, 2017).  
With the implementation of the blockchain system, entities will face challenges such as 
translating existing manual or paper-based documents into blockchain format (data needs to 
be in a digital form), which might be time-consuming and costly (Crosby et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, even if computer-based systems are utilised, they might be old and outdated, 
and will need to be upgraded before they would be compatible to the blockchain system 
(McLean & Deane-Johns, 2016). 
Redundancy, as discussed above, could be beneficial to users but on the other hand, this 
redundancy results in increased costs; furthermore, nodes require computers with increased 
processing power to be able to maintain a copy of the entire blockchain (Ammous, 2016). It 
is therefore regarded as an additional risk for potential users as the underlying costs could 
increase to an extent that the blockchain application is not economically feasible any longer. 
5.3.2 Completeness and accuracy 
Completeness and accuracy of digital records is not addressed through the blockchain 
system. Only the authenticity, validity and integrity are addressed when the transacting 
parties are confirmed, the time and date of the transaction, and the content of the record 
when it is submitted (Condos et al., 2016). 
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5.3.3 Fraud and security 
As noted by Chai and Zhu (2016), all types of fraud are not addressed through the 
blockchain application. As previously discussed, the integrity of records is addressed 
through blockchain being a distributed, public ledger which results in records being saved on 
multiple computers. Furthermore, the updating of records is dependent on the POW 
consensus system, resulting in fraudsters not easily being able to change records already 
recorded on the system.  
Even though fraud, based on objective information, for example loan applications which are 
fact-based, is sufficiently addressed through the blockchain system, the problem of fraud still 
remains. This is applicable to subject information fraud, for example rating fraud where the 
fraudulent information is not easily verified as the ratings are based on subjectivity and 
cannot be verified by the system (Chai & Zhu, 2016). However, this risk is mitigated through 
the fact that the blockchain system only allows accounts to be created based on valid 
identities. In traditional systems, one person could control and create multiple accounts, 
which increased the problem of subjective information fraud, as multiple fraudulent ratings 
could be submitted. In blockchain, even though the ratings cannot be confirmed, the number 
of fraudulent ratings is limited, since the number of users created by fraudsters is limited. 
With this technology innovation there are also new types of attacks on the system as 
described below. These attacks are not yet understood and are thus less mitigated than 
attacks occurring in conventional database architecture (Lorenz et al., 2016). 
The following attacks are discussed in more detail below: 51% attack, identity theft, money 
laundering, and hacking (Xu Xu, 2016). 
 The 51% attack
The 51% attack occurs when a single node dominates the verification and approval of
transactions on the network by having significantly more computational power than the
rest of the nodes in the network. Thus, the 51% attack results in the specific node
having more than half of the network’s processing power and consequently the ability
to outpace the rest of the nodes in the network. The node will be able to manipulate
the blockchain through including fraudulent transactions or double-spending digital
assets, for example. This risk specifically exists in blockchains with smaller networks
(Swan, 2015).
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 Identity theft
One of the characteristics of the blockchain network is privacy. The security of digital
assets is, however, dependent on the safeguarding of the private key (Xu Xu, 2016).
As explained in chapter three, the private key is required to exchange digital assets,
but if a node’s private key is stolen it cannot be recovered. Consequently, all the digital
assets held by the node will be stolen and it is highly unlikely that the thief will be
identifiable. Thus, identify theft in the blockchain environment could most likely be
more devastating than identity theft in the offline world.
For example, in the case of credit card companies, risks are controlled by central 
authorities who safeguard transactions, detect suspicious activities and assist in 
finding thieves. Furthermore, the current cryptography standards are not entirely 
uncrackable (Swan, 2015). With the development of quantum computing, it is not 
impossible for cryptographic keys to be cracked quickly, demolishing the foundation of 
blockchain technology (Crosby et al., 2016). 
 Illegal activities
Since the blockchain technology is not yet regulated it might become a possible
avenue for illegal activities. Furthermore, Bitcoins might be used for money laundering
activities (Xu Xu, 2016; Crosby et al., 2016).
 System hacking
The records stored in the blockchain are very difficult to alter or change, but the
programming codes and systems utilised to implement the technology are not very
difficult to access (Xu Xu, 2016).
5.3.4 Scalability 
Scalability of the blockchain system is a challenge because the system has a consensus-
based validation system and the ledger is continuously replicated, resulting in the increased 
amount of stored data. Therefore high-speed or high-volume transactions, real-time 
capturing and storing of large volumes of data are problematic on the blockchain system 
(Lorenz et al., 2016).  
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With the increase of transactions, the blockchain becomes large. With each node storing all 
transactions on the blockchain for validation purposes, the scalability of the blockchain is 
limited (Sompolinsky & Zohar, 2013). Furthermore, the Bitcoin blockchain is only able to 
process more or less seven transactions per second which results from the restrictions of 
block sizes and the time interval utilised in the block generation process (Nakamoto, 2008), 
which cannot fulfil the requirement of processing millions of transactions in real-time fashion 
(Zheng et al., 2016).  
A further concern resulting from the fact that all the nodes have a copy of all the transactions 
in the ledger is the possibility that the ledger might grow faster than the number of network 
nodes (Ammous, 2016). If the blockchain wants to increase the volume of transactions, the 
blocks size will need to increase, resulting in more computational power to add a block to the 
blockchain, resulting in fewer nodes adding to the network and subsequently a more 
centralised network. 
Skudnov (2012) notes that one of the reasons why the blockchain is not scalable is that 
without improvements to the Bitcoin protocol, a normal desktop computer, for example, will 
not have sufficient power to process a transaction because of the size of the blockchain. 
Furthermore, when transacting on the blockchain for the first time, the process of 
downloading the existing blockchain and validating before executing the first transaction 
could be time-consuming and increases continuously as the number of blocks in the chain 
expands (Crosby et al., 2016). 
5.3.5 Privacy 
Even though privacy is preserved through public keys in the blockchain system, 
transactional privacy cannot be guaranteed since the values of all transactions and the 
balances for all public keys are publicly visible (Kosba, Miller, Shi & Wen, 2016). 
5.3.6  Government regulations 
Regulatory compliance: Blockchains with their own currency, such as Bitcoin, are not 
regulated and not controlled by the Reserve Bank. Therefore, transactions are cleared when 
they are valid or blocked if not valid and the process cannot be overridden by regulators. 
Subsequently the application of blockchain in highly regulated professions such as law or 
finance, where currencies other than Bitcoin, which are regulated, are involved, might cause 
regulatory problems and legal complications. Furthermore, blockchain operates online and 
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across jurisdictions with different regulatory rules which will further complicate matters in 
ensuring compliance with all rules (Ammous, 2016). 
5.3.7 Quantum computing 
As the blockchain technology is based on the fact that a single party cannot resolve the 
mathematical problem resulting from a lack of computer power, the future Quantum 
computers might pose a problem. These computers might be able to crack the cryptographic 
keys easily which would cause the whole system to be inefficient. However, the keys could 
possibly be made stronger through encryption techniques to ensure that they cannot be 
cracked.  
5.3.8  Understanding by users 
A relatively high level of technical understanding is required to utilise the technology 
(Srisukvattananan, 2016). A lack of understanding could lead to inadequate technical skills 
resulting in risks not being correctly identified, defined and measured (McLean & Deane-
Johns, 2016). 
5.3.9  Irreversibility of transactions 
One of the characteristics of the blockchain technology is that blocks that have been added 
to the blockchain and subsequent blocks that are added to the validated blocks cannot be 
altered without reperforming the validation process of the block and all subsequent blocks. 
With this benefit which ensures integrity of transactions there is also a limitation of 
irreversibility and a lack of customisation. With traditional payment systems, human or 
software errors are easily reversed and corrected by intermediaries. This is not an option on 
the blockchain system (Ammous, 2016).    
5.3.10 Trust 
Although one of the characteristics of the blockchain is a trustless payment system, the 
system is not completely trustless as the users are still exposed to risk in their use of the 
blockchain technology. The ‘remaining’ trust factor for the blockchain technology is the 
blockchain software and the third parties who record information about the external world on 
the blockchain. The blockchain removes the trust for a single specific third party to maintain 
a ledger. For example, if a user accesses a blockchain through an intermediary, such as a 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
59 
digital currency exchange, they trust the intermediary. Therefore if the intermediary’s system 
fails, then the user may lose control of their assets on the blockchain (Harz, 2017).  
5.3.11 Timing errors 
In the Bitcoin blockchain, each block contains, amongst other things, a list of transactions 
and a timestamp which indicate the approximate time when the block was created (refer to 
chapter three). The timestamp of the block allows the system to regulate the production of 
Bitcoins and generate proof of the chronological order of the transactions which address the 
possible double-spending problem, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Because the 
blockchain technology is so reliant on timestamps, it is very important that the ‘timers’ of the 
nodes in the network, which keep track of the network time, are functioning properly to 
prevent timestamp errors. Yet, even when the counters are working, there is still a risk of a 
possible attack. Attackers can slow down or speed up a node’s network time counter by 
connecting as multiple peer nodes and reporting inaccurate timestamps (Culubas, 2011). 
5.3.12 Private key management by users 
Key management is a risk since this is an important part in any system which is reliant on 
cryptography. It includes the generation, exchange, storage, use and replacement of keys, 
which is a difficult process. Users need to ensure that multiple keys are simultaneously 
accessible and resistant to digital theft and loss. How to achieve effective key management, 
including system policy, user training, organisational and departmental interactions and 
coordination between these elements, remains an unresolved problem (Eskandari, Barrera, 
Stobert & Clark, 2015). Furthermore, private keys still need to be managed as they are 
vulnerable to loss or open to theft. For example, Bitcoin software manages several private 
keys by storing them on a node’s local storage in a file or database. A file containing private 
keys can be read by any application with access to the user’s application folder. Attackers 
could use this to obtain immediate access to the transaction records. Furthermore, users 
need to be careful not to share their Bitcoin application folder intentionally and they must 
also be cautious about the possibility of physical theft when using portable computers or 
smartphones (Eskandari et al., 2015).   
5.3.13 Throughput 
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In 2016 the Bitcoin network could process seven transactions per second. Other transaction 
processing networks, for example VISA, processed 2 000 transactions per second. 
Therefore the throughput of the Blockchain network will need to be improved to ensure that 
the increased frequency of transactions can be handled in future (Yli-Huumo et al., 2016). 
5.3.14 Latency 
Currently, as discussed earlier, the average time of generating a block is 10 minutes. The 
time creation of a block is to ensure that efficient security is achieved and to ensure that the 
time spent on generating a block outweighs the cost of a double-spending attack. 
Completing a transaction through VISA will only take a few seconds, which is a major 
advantage compared to blockchain (Yli-Huumo et al., 2016). 
5.4 Conclusion 
The blockchain technology characteristics can be utilised as a control mechanism to 
successfully address the significant risks identified with the exchange of digital assets. The 
technology is seen as a revolutionary innovation, resulting from the fact that the underlying 
characteristics of the technology have various applications in various industries that could 
potentially change the way risks are currently addressed and systems are currently 
operated. 
However, with the implementation of any new technology there are always additional risks 
that users need to consider, as summarised in section 5.3. The appropriateness of the 
implementation of the blockchain technology should therefore be carefully weighed up, 
taking all areas into consideration. 
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CHAPTER 6.  CONCLUSION 
Before the introduction of the blockchain technology and its potential to address the risks of 
digital asset exchange, all digital assets were linked to financial institutions, central banks or 
central trusted agencies. These trusted third parties are currently responsible for the 
transaction process and perform the role of a mediator. This results in high transaction costs 
and time delays in transaction processing. 
The blockchain technology can be seen as an exciting but disruptive new technology with 
the potential of having a major impact on many industries including the financial sector. 
Bitcoin, which was the application which first introduced the underlying technology 
blockchain, introduced a system for electronic transaction without relying on trust 
provided by third parties.  
The first objective of this research was to identify the risks present with the exchange of 
digital assets, as discussed in chapter three. The most significant inherent risks identified 
were repudiation, lack of trust, double-spending and theft (including fraud). These risks 
formed the basis of this study. 
Next, a literature review was performed. This literature review, presented in chapter four, 
included an explanation of the blockchain technology and how blockchain technology is 
applied in the Bitcoin application. Through this review the major characteristics of the 
blockchain technology were identified. These characteristics were summarised through 
discussing the various stages of a general exchange of digital asset transaction. The 
various stages were summarised in levels:  
Level 1:  Transaction initiation, which consists of the following sublevels: 
i) Transaction encryption
ii) Verification of transactions
Level 2:  Creation of transactions to form online blocks, which consists of the following 
sublevels: 
i) Blockchain blocks content
ii) Timestamping
Level 3:  The block-generation process involves one sublevel, namely: 
i) Consensus mechanisms
Level 4:  The broadcasting of the block to the entire network 
Level 5:  Network participants approving and validating transactions 
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Level 6: The block is added to the blockchain and the digital asset is exchanged. This level 
involves the following sublevels: 
i) Consensus mechanisms
ii) Blockchain maintenance
iii) Blockchain forking
Chapter four also included a summary of the classification of blockchain systems and further 
advantages of the blockchain technology.  
In chapter five the identified characteristics of the blockchain technology were mapped to the 
identified risks identified in chapter three. This was done by firstly discussing the current 
traditional manner of addressing the identified risks, followed by discussing how the 
blockchain technology’s potential to address the identified risks, summarised in a quick 
reference matrix for potential users. The chapter also included a summary of the additional 
risks potential users need to consider before implementing the blockchain technology. 
Since this study did not focus on providing details of possible implementation in the various 
industries such as the financial sector and the effect thereof on the specific industries, these 
areas remain available for further research studies 
It is therefore concluded that the underlying blockchain technology characteristics have the 
ability to address significant risks with the exchanging of digital assets, which no previous 
technologies have had the ability to resolve without human intervention, the use of internal 
controls or trusted third parties. Furthermore, the matrix provided can be used as a quick 
guide to identify specific blockchain characteristics and what risks each specific 
characteristic is addressing and the consequent control objective achieved through 
addressing these risks.  
Therefore the matrix can be used by various industries to evaluate whether the blockchain 
characteristics will address their specific risks and achieve their control objectives. The 
underlying blockchain technology is a new and an exciting technology innovation. Not only 
does this technology have the ability to address specific risks with the exchanging of digital 
assets but it is also expected to have far-reaching possibilities in the financial sector and 
many other industries in the near future. 
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